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Regulating the Economy in the Courts: 
Antitrust Today 
By George J. Alexander * 
(J amesz'ille) 
Ant,itrust law has long been a foggy area to both lawyers and busmessmen. Professor Alexander's article is addressed to the 
unsophisticated in Antitrust. He offers it in the hope that it will 
serve as a gU'ide to lawyers unfamiliar with this complex area of the 
law. 
George J. Alexander 
 HALLMARK cjf American society is its basic economic philosophy. Free e,n­terprise is more than an economic theory; 
it is an ideology, a slogan to generalize about 
complex industrial organization, a shorthand 
notation which many think explains the af­
fluence which we share. Its first command­
ment is, Thou shalt not interfere with business 
judgments made by businessmen; thou shalt 
not regulate. 
Of late, with increasing tempo, we hear of 
mergers opposed by the Department of Justice, 
ordered dissolved by courts. We hear a Justice 
of the United States Supreme Court describe 
the success of the Justice Department: 
'''The sole consistency that I can find is That lawyers should meddle, that in [merger] litigation, the Govern-
ment always wins.'" selectively, in business judgments 
The process, of course, is regula­
tion; the courts are the enforce­
ment vehicle and antitrust law is 
the tool of regulation. Legislators 
have given to lawyers the job of 
tinkering with the general economy 
and, especially in the post World 
War II period, lawyers have en­
g�ged in the process with some 
vlgor. 
* Professor of Law, Syracuse University 
College of Law, author of numerous articles 
and several books, member of the New 
York Bar. 
has made many angry; others have 
condemned the fact that the courts 
have not basicly reorganized our 
national economy-that General 
Motors still exists and du Pont, too 
( although it no longer controls 
G.M. stock thanks to antitrust 
lawyers) when smaller corpora­
tions are what they envisaged. 
Some 'suggest that more of the 
process be given to administrators 
under new legislation. (Hardly 
anyone thinks that the present Fed­
eral Trade Commission is sub­
stantially different 11 approach 
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from the antitrust lawyers outside 
the agency.) Others are satisfied 
to leave the work to lawyers but 
want the legal standards modified 
in some dramatic way so that their 
own goals for the economy can be 
reached more quickly. Interest­
ingly, though, there appears to be 
a high level of dissatisfaction with 
specifics, few urge the abandon­
ment of the system in favor of 
greater direct regulation of prices, 
wages, and levels of production by 
government. For that we can 
probably'thank the horrible exam­
ple of utility regulation in our 
country. 
Lawyers also disagree among 
themselves about antitrust. There 
is not even agreement about where 
antitrust is headed among the per­
sons whose judgment finally sets 
the pattern: the Justices of the 
Supreme Court of the United 
States. That is true of the mem­
bers of the present Court and has 
been true of the Court since it be­
gan to consider antitrust. The 
diversity of possible goals contrib­
utes greatly to the failure to focus 
on a single goal or on an accom­
modation of a small number of 
goals. A few examples may help 
to illustrate the point. N ear the 
turn of the century the makers of 
Sewer pipes formed an association 
which, among other things, worked 
out a very efficient way to help its 
members bid on contracts to be 
awarded. Each member first bid 
for the right to bid in the contract. 
The highest bidder won the right 
and all the other would overbid 
him in the public bidding. He 
would get the contract and they 
would get a share of the amount 
he bid to the association for their 
cooperation. There were many 
virtues in the arrangement; even 
some of the customers who were 
paying what must have been higher 
prices came to court to commend 
it but, at heart, it was a price fix­
ing scheme pure and simple. The 
association members had, in con­
cert, arrogated the power of a 
monopolist. They had started out 
to defeat the effects of competition 
among members and had suc­
ceeded. Therefore, the decision 
was relatively uncomplicated. The 
court had either to choose competi­
tion and its control over resource 
allocation or to opt for some form 
of management (either by business 
or by government) of such things. 
Since the antitrust laws' were quite 
clear in their purpose to achieve a 
competitively oriented economy, 
the decision was equally clear: the 
association was found to have 
broken the law. 
Cases like the pipe aSSOCIatIOn 
case mentioned (Addyston Pipe 
and Steel) are decided the same 
way today. When people get to­
gether with their competitors to 
fix prices, they defeat the control 
of a competitive market. For that, 
as some found not too long ago, 
one can draw a jail sentence. 
In the kind of arrangement men­
tioned all the factors fall nicely in 
place. Much harder problems are 
presented by industrial growth 
whether through contract, through 
merger, or by building additional 
capacity. While one can be con­
cerned that competition among the 
auto makers is not all that it might 
be, it is not fair to assert that the 
degree of concentration was arti­
ficially created to allow manipula­
tion of the market. The problem 
is far more complex; it may even 
be more efficient to produce cars 
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in the present large corporations 
than it is to produce them in smaller 
companies. If that is true, the re­
sult of decimating the industry and 
thus making it more competitive 
may be to raise the cost of cars. 
That, you will recall, was not a 
problem in the pipe case because 
it was clear that there were no 
production or even distribution 
shortcuts involved. The associa­
tion served only to control output 
and price. At this point, then, ab­
sent relative certainty as to what 
constitutes most efficient size 
(something we are far' from having 
at the moment), one is forced to 
choose between industrial concentra­
tion which may be anticompetitive 
and diffusion of production which 
may be costly to the consumer as 
much as to the persons who have 
invested in the industry or who 
work in it. 
The choice is further compli­
cated by the fact that one may 
choose one or the other alternative 
for compiete1y opposite reasons. 
For example, one may choose to 
allow large size because of a per­
suasion that large corporations are 
relatively responsible and ought not 
to be interfered with until a gross 
abuse can be demonstrated-a 
viewpoint we might want to char­
acterize as conservative-or from a 
recognition that to interfere with 
present organization may threaten 
the existence of numerous smaller 
business units and of labor which 
depend on the large corporations, 
probably a liberal philosophy. 
Because of such complexities, 
we find conservative justices like 
the present Mr. Justice Harlan dis­
senting against interdicting the 
merger of the small Rome Cable 
compa.ny and Alcoa in a case writ-
ten by th.e liberal Mr. Justice 
Douglas and Justice Douglas dis­
'senting in a decision which ordered 
the Standard Oil Company of Cali­
fornia to stop making exclusive 
dealing and tying contracts with 
its customers because small service 
stations can operate under the ar­
rangement but might be driven out 
of business were Standard Oil to 
undertake t�e distributive operation 
itself. 
When other variables are con­
sidered, the matter becomes even 
more clouded. During the depres­
sion, fuels were hard hit. In both 
the coal industry and the oil in­
dustry internal arrangements were 
made in an attempt to keep the sup­
ply of fuel from leading to a con­
tinuous downward spiraling of 
prices. While such a trend in 
prices might be called for by a 
competitive model as a means of 
reorganizing the industry, the im­
mediate costs in labor displacement 
and in the confidence of investors 
was unacceptable, given the panic 
then at large. The Supreme Court 
heard cases involving both indus­
tries and allowed a scheme in coal 
while disapproving one  in oil. It 
is difficult to state whether the 
court felt it should consider the 
general state of the economy or 
not. 
Of course, it does not stop there. 
When producers cooperate in ex­
port, they may affect the balance of 
trade problem. An inefficient pro­
ducer may be needed in the economy 
to pave the way for future military 
production. A form of business 
may appeal because it gives an op­
portunity to small investors to have 
their own store; one is reminded 
of the corner grocer for whom 
Congress expressed such concern 
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and whom it sought, in vain, to 
protect with price discrimination 
legislation. The list of possible 
concerns is finite but very long. 
I f the courts attempted to ac­
commodate all competing interests 
with only the sketchy guidance of 
the antitrust laws, they could prop­
erly be condemned for usurpation 
of a legislative function; they 
would also become so en snarled in 
considerations that the cases would 
likely flounder. Recognizing their 
limitations, courts have attempted 
to reduce antitrust to more limited 
factors. A good deal of the ap­
parent contradiction in the cases 
results from the effort to strike a 
balance not only between what is 
legitimately business judgment and 
what should be supervised by 
courts, but also between making 
judgments based on insufficient in­
formation and admitting an un­
manageable amount of evidence to 
cloud the cases. 
In order to examine how courts 
have dealt with cases in which com­
peting considerations loom large. 
it is helpful to examine the courts' 
response to monopolization. A 
classic case concerns Alcoa's pre­
World War n control of virgin 
aluminum. Although there were 
a number of plausible explanations 
which accounted for the fact that 
Alcoa had no significant competi­
tors in aluminum production, Judge 
Learned Hand, announcing the 
final decision in the case, con­
demned Alcoa's market power and 
found it guilty of monopolization. 
The principal reason given for the 
conclusion was the fact that Alcoa 
had, throughout its history, actively 
sought to maintain its position in 
an expanding market. Whatever 
economic merit existed in a single 
firm's control, Judge Hand felt that 
the resultant lack of competition 
had to be condemned. He ex­
plained 
We conclude therefore that "Alcoa's" 
control over the ingot market must be 
reckoned at over nmety per cent; that 
being the proportion which its rroduction 
bears to imported "virgin" ingot. If the 
fraction which it did not supr!y were 
the produce of domestic manufacture, 
there could be ho doubt that this per
centage gave it a monopoly lawful or 
unlawful, as the case might be. The 
producer of so large a proportion of the 
supply has complete control within 
certain limits. I t is true that, if by 
raising the price he reduces the amount 
which can be marketed as always, or 
almost always, h;tppens-he may invite 
the expansion of the small producers 
who will try to fill the place left open; 
nevertheless, not only is there an inevi­
table lag in this, but the large producer 
is in a strong position to check such 
competition; and, indeed, if he has re­
tained his old plant and personnel, he 
can inevitably do so. There are indeed 
limits to his power; substitutes are 
available for almost all commodities, and 
to raise the price enough is to evoke 
them. Moreover, it is difficult and ex
pensive to keep idle any part of a plant 
or of personnel; and any drastic con
traction of the market will offer increas
ing· temptation to the small producers 
to expand. But these limitations also 
exist when a single producer occupies 
the whole market: even then, his hold 
will depend upon his moderation in ex­
erting his immediate power. 
. . . Even though we disregarded all 
but economic considerations, it would by 
no means follow that such concentration 
of producing power is to be desired. 
when it has not been used extortionately. 
Many people believe that possession of 
unchallenged economic power deadens 
initiative, discourages thrift and de­
presses energy; that immunity from 
competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is 
a stimulant, to industrial progress; that 
the spur of constant stress is necessary 
to counteract an inevitable disposition 
to let well enough alone. Such people 
believe that competitors, versed in the 
craft as no consumer can be, will be 
quick to detect opportunities for saving 
and new shifts in production, and be 
eager to profit by them. In any event 
the mere fact that a producer, having 
command of the domestic market, has 
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not been able to make more than a 
"fair" profit, is no evidence that a "fair" 
profit could not have been made at 
lower prices. True, it might have been 
thought adequate to condemn only those 
monopolies which could not show that 
they had exercised the highest possible 
ingenuity, had adopted every possible 
economy, had anticipated every conceiv­
able improvement, stimulated every pos­
sible demand. No doubt, that would 
be one way of dealing with the matter, 
although it would imply constant scrutiny 
and constant supervision, such as courts 
are unable to provide. Be that as it may, 
that was not the way that Congress 
chose; it did not condone "good trusts' ' 
and condemn '''bad'' ones; it forbad all. 
The concern withrnncentration 
that was evidenced by Judge Hand 
in the Alcoa case remains impor­
tant as well in the present state of 
merger cases. Indeed, the 1950 
Congressional amendment of the 
antimerger provision in the Clayton 
Act has been interpreted by the 
Supreme Court as a mandate to 
supply more of the same, to in­
crease the sanctions against size 
and to nip the problem of in­
dustrial concentration effectively, 
long before the antimonopoly pro­
visions used in Alcoa would de­
mand the same results. 
While Congress cannot be taken 
as having spoken to the question 
of the limits of scale efficiencies in 
national industries generally, and 
while the Alcoa decision must also 
be read as a decision premised on 
a desire to prevent concentration 
despite efficiencies if that was neces­
sary, a word must be said about 
efficiencies and the present level of 
antimerger enforcement. It has 
remained true, throughout the 
period from Alcoa on, that courts 
have realistically abandoned the 
idea they were competent to make 
judgments about optimum indus­
trial organization. Judge Hand in 
Alcoa spoke to the competing goals 
of antitrust when he mentioned 
that we were a country dedicated 
to economic pluralism. 
It is possible, because of its indirect 
social or moral effect, to prefer a system 
of small producers, each dependant for 
his success upon his own skill and 
character, to one in which the great 
mass of those engaged must accept the 
direction of a few. These considera­
tions, which we have suggested only as 
possible purposes of the Act, we think 
the decisions prove to have been in fact 
its purposes. 
The same kind of language finds 
itself, probably for the same reason, 
in the merger cases. It is difficult 
to isolate, from the cases them­
selves, an approach radically differ­
ent from the approach used by 
Judge Hand in Alcoa, though one 
should say in fairness that the cases 
are a trifle more disengenuous than 
was Judge Hand in eschewing the 
costs involved. A passage some­
times pointed to by such critics of 
present antitrust policy as Profes­
sor Bork of Yale is the passage in 
the Brown Shoe case: 
Of course, some of the results of large 
integrated or chain operations are bene­
ficial to consumers. Their expansion is 
not rendered unlawful by the mere fact 
that small independent stores may be 
adversely affected .  It is competition, not 
competitors, which the Act protects. But 
we cannot fail to recognize Congress' 
desire to promote competition through 
the protection of viable, small, locally 
owned businesses. Congress appreciated 
that occasional higher costs and prices 
might result from the maintenance of 
fragmented industries and markets. It 
resolved these competing considerations 
in favor of decentralization. We must 
give effect to that decision. 
The paragraph seems to indicate 
an unwillingness on the part of the 
court to choose between the goals 
of an economy made efficient by 
competition and an economy con­
sciously made more pluralistic but 
which is not as efficient as it might 
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become at the next level of concen­
tration. It is delightful to eschew 
simultaneously an antitrust law 
designed to preserve competitors 
rather than competition and an 
antitrust law that allows greater 
concentration-but one cannot have 
it both ways. If, in Brown Shoe, 
one was attempting to preserve 
small independent units for fear 
that their. elimination would ulti­
mately make it more difficult for 
other independents, Jhat is one 
thing, but it is not the same thing 
as asking whether one can more 
efficiently sell shoes through ver­
tically integrated firms. Despite 
the broad language in the opinion, 
the Chief Justice appears to recog­
nize this paradox when he lists as 
one of the vices of the Brown­
Kinney merger the fact that the 
newly integrated retail stores may 
be enabled by cost savings adversely 
to affect the nonintegrated firms. 
If that's not preserving competi­
tors, what is? 
This is not to say, of course, that 
the antimerger policy of the gov­
ernment has been, in the main, 
misguided. It does illustrate, how­
ever, the fact that a concern with 
industrial concentration must of 
necessity either relate to the effi­
ciencies involved (which is prob­
ably beyond the capacity of courts) 
or must expect to pay a price in 
economic distortion for a far more 
complex pluralistic goal. 
In effect, it has become quite 
clear in recent years that a company 
must be prepared in an industry 
which is already concentrated or 
in an industry in which that firm 
has a large percentage share to 
accomplish growth without buying 
a competitive firm and probably 
without buying firms which are 
suppliers or customers as well. At 
some point, it may also be prohib­
ited from bringing under corporate 
rule essentially unrelated firms be­
cause of the possibility of the use 
of its own economic power to dis­
tort either its own or its acquired 
firms' competitive markets. The 
price exacted is, not necessarily 
cheap. It means, to take the recent 
Korvette-Spartan merger as an il­
h,lstration, that firms may have to 
alter basically their own structure 
or, as has been true in so many of 
the mergers that have been pro­
hibited, that the Company must 
Ibuild new facilities in which to '
accomplish what might have been 
accomplished otherwise by acquisi­
tion. But while this is true, sev­
eral other things must be said as 
well. In the first place, the anti­
merger law does not place an upper 
limit on individual growth. It is 
still the antimonopoly provision 
which ultimately is relied on to pre­
vent a firm from growth unac­
companied by acquisitional or con­
tractual expansion. Secondly, 
although the government has been 
amazingly successful in its prose­
cution, it has certainly not univer­
sally prosecuted large merging 
firms. In the selection process in 
which decisions to bring suit or 
not to bring suit is made, one must 
assume responsible governmental 
officials have attempted to select 
cases by the overall perceived im­
pact of the merger (an admittedly 
vague concept) even if the courts 
ha�e not been asked to participate 
in the evaluation of the political 
decisions that have been made. 
The courts have retained a func­
tion that they are capable of hand­
ling. They have left to themselves 
the resolution of a set of issues far 
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less sophisticated than the broad 
issue of whether a merger is in the 
public interest. The courts have, 
in other words, reduced antitrust 
merger cases to the kind of evidence 
which can conceivably be intro­
duced and weighed in a finite trial, 
albeit usually a protracted one. 
Another product of the concern 
for handling complex economic 
matters expeditiously is the area 
of per se illegal conduct. When 
Judge Taft wrote in Addyston 
Pipe and Steel about the conduct of 
the l$ewer pipe trade association, he 
condemned it out of hand irrespec­
tive on any noneconomic virtue it 
might have for conSumers and ir­
respective of the stabilizing effect 
it might have on the industry. 
When Mr. Justice Stone later in 
Trenton Potteries condemned an­
other price-fixing arrangement, he 
also condemned it as a per se viola­
tion, refusing to concern himself 
with any possible justification for 
the price-fixing endeavor. Into the 
category of per se conduct fall such 
other offenses as horizontal market 
division and boycott. 
Judge Taft was willing without 
further examination to write off 
price fixers because he perceived 
the probability of control of pro­
duction as a necessity to the effec­
tive working of such an ar­
rangement. It is not possible, 
presumably, artificiallY' to set a 
price in a competitive market. If 
a price is effectively set, then, it 
seems quite likely that the price 
setters have demonstrated that in 
the aggregate they have control 
over price (and therefore presum­
ably the level of production) . 
Market division by competitors 
again implies individual control of 
the areas in which competition is 
foreclosed. A seller who is apt to 
lose his customers to other com­
petitors if he raises his price seems 
unlikely to agree to give up the 
right to sell his product elsewhere 
for the privilege of keeping other 
signatories out of his market. 
Again, unless another explanation 
is given, the fact that the arrange­
ment has been entered into suggests 
a level of market control which 
might properly be interdicted under 
the restraint of trade provisions in 
the antitrust law. 
Cases of trade restraint falling 
outside the per se group are gov­
erned by the rule of reason. It is 
popularly believed that, under that 
standard, judicial inquiry is broad 
in scope and that almost unlim­
ited evidence may be introduced to 
persuade a court to approve or con­
demn. In point of fact, the inquiry 
is far more limited. Discussing 
an exclusive dealing and typing ar­
rangement, Mr. Justice Frank­
furter commented: 
Yet serious difficulties would attend 
the attempt to apply [economic 1 tests. 
We may assume, as did the court below, 
that no improvement of Standard's com­
petitive position has coincided with the 
period during which the requirements­
contract system of distribution has been 
in effect. We may assume further that 
the duration of the contracts is not 
excessive and that Standard does not by 
itself dominate the market. But Stan­
dard was a major competitor when the 
present system was adopted, and it is 
possible that its position would have 
deteriorated but for the adoption of that 
system. When it is remembered that 
all the other major suppliers have also 
been using requirements contracts, and 
when it is noted that the relative share 
of the business which fell to each has 
remained about the same during the 
period of their use, it would not be 
farfetched to infer that their effect, has 
been to enable the established suppliers 
individually to maintain their own stand­
ing and at the same time collectively, 
even though not collusively, to pr,event 
a late arrival from wresting away more 
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than an insignificant portion of the 
market. If, indeed, this were a result of 
the system, it would seem unimportant 
that a short-run by-product of stability 
may have been greater efficiency and 
lower costs, for it is the theory of the 
antitrust laws that the. long-run advan­
tage of the community depends upon the 
removal of restraints upon competition. 
Moreover, to demand that bare in­
ference be supported by evidence as to' 
what would have happened but for the 
adoption of the practice that was in fact 
adopted or to require firm prediction of 
an increase of competition as a probable 
result of ordering t':1e abandonment of 
the practice, would be a standard .)f 
proof if not virtually impossible to meet, 
at least most ill-suited for ascertainment 
by courts. Before the system of require
ments contracts was instituted, Standard 
sold gasoline through independent serv­
ice-station operators as its agents, and 
it might revert to this system if the 
judgment below were sustained. Or it 
might, as opportunity presented itself, 
add service' stations now operated in­
dependently to the number managed by 
its subsidiary, Standard Stations, Inc. 
From the point of view of maintaining 
or extending competitive advantage, 
either of these alternatives would be 
just as effective as the use of require
ments contracts, although of course in­
sofar as they resulted in a tendency t: 
monopoly they might encounter the anti­
monopoly provisions of the Sherman 
Act. As appellant points out. dealers 
might order petroleum products in 
quantities sufficient to meet their es­
timated needs for the period during 
which requirements contracts are now 
effective, and even that would foreclose 
competition to some degree. So long 
as these diverse ways of restricting 
competition remain open, therefore, there 
can be no conclusive proof that the use 
of requirements contracts has actually 
reduced competition below the level 
which it would otherwise have reached 
or maintained. 
While it is true that Justice 
Frankfurter was interpreting the 
requirements of a specific antitrust 
provision concerning the practice 
in question, his observations apply 
with equal force to other practices. 
On the whole, one can find courts 
responding to this type of concern. 
They attempt to discover what the 
central purpose of the arrangement 
in question is and then to condemn 
or approve it by relating the dis­
covered purpose to a competitive 
model. If, like price fixing, the 
model suggests that the arrange­
ment is anticompetitive, it is con­
demned. If, on the other hand, 
the agreement merely alIows the 
parties to accomplish something 
that seems legitimate when viewed 
from the perspective of the model, 
it escapes censure. Thus, for ex­
ample, when the Chicago Board of 
Trade adopted a rule which re­
quired the members to pay for 
grain which arrived in Chicago 
after the market closed at the clos­
ing price, the agreement was held 
legal since it was thought to facili­
tate the running of the exchange. 
If it is essential in franchises of 
some sorts to require the fran­
chisees to limit their sales  to as­
signed territories or to buy their 
supplies from certain suppliers, 
such restrictions also escape cen­
sure. 
Also, it seems quite welI settled 
that in the rule of reason cases 
the courts will not attempt to 
weigh collateral benefits arising 
from otherwise anti competitive 
schemes. Even if a price fixing 
conspiracy might improve interna­
tional trade, stabilize production 
and resist labor displacements, the 
cases seem agreed that such mat­
ters are not for courts to consider. 
The embarrassment of courts in 
citing the depression coal case in 
which the Supreme Court applied 
antitrust less harshly, suggests that 
no new attempt at broader inquiry 
is likely soon to succeed. 
StilI, it is true of the trade re­
straint cases, as it was of the con­
centration cases, that often the price 
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to be paid for enforcement is high. 
Some cases, like the Addyston Pipe 
and Steel case, are clearly restraint 
cases in which no efficiencies are 
involved. Some restraints are 
equally clearly so necessary to a 
valid objective as not to be subject 
to challenge: Judge Taft suggested 
the illustration of a contract by 
business partners not· to compete 
with each other outside of the part­
nership. In between, courts are 
forced to decide whether an agree­
ment falls more into the first or 
into the second group. Many 
agreements share with many merg­
ers the disconcerting fact that 
efficiencies and restraints may be 
intermingled. Whether the courts 
have found the right place at which 
to draw the line is controversial. 
What makes the courts a prefer­
able agency for economic regula­
tion, despite the uncertainties and 
the mistakes is the fact that courts 
are probably better equipped to ac­
complish the relatively delicate ad­
justments which we will tolerate 
in our economic philosophy. Courts 
need not generalize as legislatures 
must. They need not try to place 
each case into a fixed scheme for 
an entire industry which may still 
be beyond administrative compe� 
tence. Much of the selection of 
cases is not random but predeter­
mined by decisions made by the 
Attorney General and so partakes 
of some of the virtue of adminis­
trative selection. Finally, and most 
significantly, the adjustment is es­
sentially pragmatic and overall 
much less substantial in effect than 
any alternative pervasive scheme 
of regulation known to the author. 
This is a rather dismal defense of 
eighty years of antitrust. It does 
seem clear, though, that the laws 
have not immaculated the economy 
and one cannot be as sure of othe'r 
regulatory schemes that abound. 
While it is short of ringing praise, 
one might be satisfied if he con­
curred that the courts have proven 
themselves less incompetent than 
other agencies that have tried to 
improve on the free market. 
[End] 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Attorney General Ramsey Clark said Marshall's elevation to  the 
Supreme Court would add "a wealth of legal experience rarely equalled 
in the history of the court. 
"He has been a distinguished leader of the American Bar since finish­
ing at the top of his class at Howard Law School in 1933-as one of 
the few attorneys in history to appear before the court more than 50 
times, as a member of the nation's second highest court, and as solicitor 
general of the United States. 
"I have no doubt that his future contributions will add even more 
prominence to his already well-established place in American history." 
-Quoted in Binghamton Press, June 13, 1967, page 9-A. 
